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ABSTRACT
This Note argues that the United States should adopt a territorial tax system. Currently, the
United States is one of a small group of nations that employs a worldwide system of taxation.
Under a worldwide system, income is taxed both in the country where it is earned and in the
country where the taxpayer resides. Alternatively, under a territorial system, income is taxed
only in the country where it is earned. By adopting a territorial system, the United States would
jettison the duplicative taxation inherent in the worldwide system. Additionally, the presence of
anti-inversion rules, controlled foreign corporation rules, and the rise of service-based economies
will enable the United States to adopt a territorial system without fear of large scale capital
flight.

I. INTRODUCTION
Johnny Depp has had a long and successful film career. A versatile actor, Depp has lent
his talents to a variety of roles in dozens of films spanning a multitude of genres. 1 It was Depp’s
turn as a swashbuckling bandit for the Walt Disney Corporation, though, that paved the way for
him to spend time atop the list of Hollywood’s highest-paid actors. 2 Disney’s The Pirates of the
Caribbean franchise has grossed more than $3.7 billion over the last decade with domestic
audiences contributing one-third of the total. 3
Johnny Depp owes a lot to American consumers, but that has not stopped Depp, an
American, from acquiring a reputation as a Europhile and even going so far as to describe his
native land as “a dumb puppy.” 4 So fans and non-fans alike were surprised when Depp revealed
in an interview two years ago that he had given up his expatriate existence in France and
returned to the incompetent canine. 5 The reason for Depp’s departure was less shocking. Like
the fictional Jack Sparrow, Depp balked when it came to parting with his treasure. 6
The French government wanted to classify Depp as a permanent resident, which would
have subjected him to France’s high marginal income tax rates. 7 Additionally, Depp would have
been subject to the United States’ income tax rates regardless of where he earned his income. 8 If
Depp wanted to keep his American citizenship, he would have to be willing, as Depp put it, to
“work for free.” 9
The United States is one of a small group of nations and an even smaller group of
industrialized nations that employs a worldwide system of taxation. 10 Under a worldwide tax
system, income is taxed both in the country where it is earned and in the country where the
taxpayer resides. 11 Most other countries employ a territorial tax system. 12 Under a territorial tax
system, income is taxed only at the source. 13 In other words, income earned in one country is
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not taxed anywhere else. 14 The United States should jettison the duplicative taxation inherent in
the worldwide system and adopt a territorial tax system.
Foreign tax credits that help offset the portion of a taxpayer’s foreign income that is taxed
by foreign governments may make Johnny Depp’s remark about working for free somewhat of
an exaggeration. However, the credit’s limits make it likely that Depp would have been
subjected to at least some double taxation. 15 This outcome illustrates the need for the United
States to adopt a territorial tax system.
Section II of this note discusses the current state of international tax law both in the
United States and abroad and the deleterious effects of the worldwide system. Section III
outlines proposed legislation to shift the United States from a worldwide system of taxation to a
territorial system. Section IV discusses why anti-inversion rules, the inclusion of controlled
foreign corporation rules in the proposed legislation, and the rise of service-based economies will
prevent capital flight from accompanying a shift to a territorial system of taxation. It also details
how the United States would uniquely benefit from such a shift.
II. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
A. Contrasting Theories
The economics of international taxation has long been dominated by two theories. 16 One
theory, capital export neutrality (CEN), postulates that tax rates on marginal investment should
be identical regardless of whether an investor is investing at home or abroad. 17 According to
CEN, international tax considerations should be removed from investment decisions by applying
both domestic and foreign income tax rates to foreign earnings and subsequently leveling the
difference between the rates through the use of tax credits. 18 In other words, if an American
corporation were to make an investment in a foreign country with a 40% corporate tax rate, the
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investment would be subject to both the United States’ 35% corporate tax rate and the 40%
foreign rate. 19 The investment would then be eligible for a 35% foreign tax credit in the U.S.,
the maximum amount that may be credited under U.S. law. 20 CEN is the operative theory of
worldwide tax systems. 21
The alternate theory, capital import neutrality (CIN), represents the principle that tax
rates on marginal investment in a given country should be identical regardless of where the
investor is domiciled. 22 For example, an American corporation investing in a hypothetical
foreign country would pay income tax on that investment to the foreign country and nothing to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 23 CIN provides the theoretical basis for territorial
taxation. 24
B. A Brief History of International Taxation
1. International Taxation in American Law
United States policy has always subscribed to the premise of worldwide taxation. 25 After
the income tax was enacted in 1913, Congress made foreign taxes deductible to mitigate the
double taxation on foreign income. 26 Low taxes were a casualty of World War I as governments
at home and abroad increased taxes to pay for the expensive global conflict. 27 In response,
Congress established the foreign tax credit to further ameliorate the problem of double
taxation. 28 The foreign tax credit may be utilized in one of two ways. 29 The taxpayer may
simply deduct foreign taxes from their U.S. income taxes or the taxpayer may credit foreign
taxes against their U.S. tax liability on a dollar for dollar basis. 30 A panoply of additional
deductions, credits, deferrals, and exclusions have been added to the U.S. tax code in the ensuing
nine decades.
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Currently, the United States persists in adhering to a worldwide system despite recent
repeated recommendations from various blue-ribbon panels such as the President’s Advisory
Panel on Tax Reform and the recent Simpson-Bowles Commission to adopt a territorial
system. 31

2. The Evolution of International Taxation Abroad
a. Origins
The debate over international taxation has its roots in the League of Nations (the League),
an international body established in the wake of World War I of which the United States was
never a part. 32 Article 24 of the Covenant of the League of Nations tasked the League with
disseminating information and assistance relating to matters international in scope. 33 League
economists quickly began taking steps to address the question of international taxation. 34
In April 1923, the League issued its first report on the matter of international taxation. 35
The League proposed avoiding the problem of double taxation by bestowing the right of taxation
on the country with which the taxpayer owed an economic allegiance. 36 The report posited four
factors for the determination of such an allegiance: “(1) origin of wealth, (2) situs of wealth, (3)
place of enforcement rights to wealth, and (4) where wealth was consumed.” 37
The 1923 report also identified four possible systems of international taxation. 38 The
first option called for vesting all taxing rights with the jurisdiction in which the income was
earned, or simply, the “source country.” 39 This approach is a territorial system. The second
option vested taxing rights with the country “of residence.” 40 This approach is a worldwide
system. The third option proposed income to be proportionally allocated between the source
country and country of residence. 41 Lastly, the fourth option called for income to classified into
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different categories with the right to tax some categories of income belonging to the source
country and the right to tax other categories of income belonging to the country of residence. 42
This was known as the “classification-and-assignment” option. 43
The League economists favored the second option (the worldwide system). 44 However,
the economists recognized that this approach would not go over well with the countries that were
not industrial powers. 45 They understood that multinational corporations (MNCs) headquartered
in an industrialized country but with operations in a developing country would pay taxes solely
to the industrialized country. This deprived the developing country of any tax revenue from the
MNCs’ operations within their borders. Naturally, developing countries would not be fond of
this proposal.
Worried about the practical difficulties in persuading developing countries to adopt a
worldwide system of international taxation, the League economists put forward the
classification-and-assignment system for countries at unequal levels of development. 46 Income
was divided into categories based on the principle that corporate parents provided the capital and
intellectual property to conduct business in foreign locales. 47 Therefore, the right to tax income
that derived from tangible assets such as land, commercial establishments, minerals, and
agriculture was given to the source country. 48 Income that derived from less tangible sources
was given to the country of residence. 49
While the classification-and-assignment approach was more palatable to developing
countries, it presented problems of its own. 50 Foremost among these was the problem of
“homeless income.” 51 Homeless income is income that avoids taxation in both the source
country and the country of residence. 52 This is accomplished through the creation of holding
companies and establishing them as residents in countries with no income tax. 53 Thus, when
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operating under a worldwide or classification-and-assignment system, an MNC could potentially
escape all or most of its tax liability. 54 The recommendations in the 1923 League of Nations
report did not address the problem of homeless income. 55
b. Cui bono?
The recommendations of the 1923 report revealed a strong bias against territorial
taxation. 56 The economists who wrote the 1923 report believed that territorial systems were
based on “antiquated theories of taxation and predicted that source-based taxation would
diminish in importance as semi-developed nations became more industrialized.” 57 These views
reveal a strong desire on the part of the League economists to orient policy towards the needs of
imperial powers at the expense of colonies and other developing countries. 58
Foremost among the imperial powers at the time was Great Britain. 59 Like most if not all
imperial powers, Great Britain exported far more capital than it imported. 60 Naturally, Great
Britain recognized that worldwide taxation was in its national interest. 61 As the world’s primary
superpower at that time, Great Britain’s policy preferences greatly influenced the debate. 62
Despite support for the League economists from powerful interests, the findings
contained in the 1923 report were not without critics. 63 Georg Schanz, a German legal scholar,
held that depriving a developed country the right to tax the activities of MNCs within its borders
“was outrageous and contradicted principles held by all countries.” 64 Schanz also dismissed the
classification-and-assignment system as “arbitrary and incapable of being justified on any
reasoned basis.” 65 Schanz proposed the adoption of the proportional allocation approach where
the great bulk of the income from operations in a source country would be taxed by the source
country. 66 However, Schanz’s argument was not nearly enough to dissuade the League from
expressing a preference for worldwide taxation. 67
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c. Permanent Establishments
Several years later, the League tasked a group of technical experts, including experts
from the United States, with the creation of a model convention relating to international
taxation. 68 At the suggestion of the American experts, the group reached a compromise that
allowed source countries to impose withholding taxes on certain income. 69 To prevent double
taxation, the residence country would provide a foreign tax credit to offset any taxes paid to the
source country. 70 In addition, source country taxation would only apply if the MNC had a
permanent establishment in the source country. 71 These recommendations were included in the
1927 Draft Model Convention. 72
d. Insurrection and Suppression
Utilizing the template of the 1927 Draft Model Convention, the Polish and Hungarian
governments executed a bilateral tax treaty in 1928. 73 However, the Poland-Hungary treaty
differed from the 1927 Draft Model Convention by expanding the definition of a permanent
establishment to include “all permanent representatives of a business entity whether or not the
representative had the authority to bind the foreign company.” 74 This skewed the treaty towards
territoriality. 75
Concerned that Poland and Hungary had used the 1927 Draft Model Convention to
establish a system that had territorial characteristics, the Fiscal Committee of the League of
Nations took action to prevent further perversions of the model convention. 76 The Fiscal
Committee sought to accomplish this through narrowing the definition of a permanent
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establishment. 77 By 1930, the Fiscal Committee would adopt a permanent establishment
definition that excluded both foreign subsidiaries and representatives that had no authority to
bind the corporate parent. 78 A subsequent report by the Fiscal Committee confirmed this
definition of permanent establishment in 1933. 79
In 1935, the League promulgated a revised Draft Model Treaty that further entrenched
the principles of worldwide taxation. 80 The 1935 Draft Model Treaty was a confluence of three
principles. 81 First, it reaffirmed the definition of permanent establishment as excluding
subsidiaries and independent agents. 82 Second, when allocating profits between source countries
and countries of residence, the source country may reach only profits from the operations within
its country and not profits from the entire corporate structure. 83 Third, withholding taxes on
source-based royalties were eliminated. 84 Together, these principles removed nearly all vestiges
of territoriality from mainstream international taxation theory. 85 The exploitative practices
employed by MNCs in developing countries had received ratification by the League of
Nations. 86
e. Territorial Gains
With worldwide taxation at the height of its popularity, the problem of homeless income
continued unabated. 87 Realizing that the laudable goal of preventing double taxation was being
usurped by MNCs to create homeless income, the Assembly of the League of Nations charged
the Fiscal Committee to address what the Assembly referred to as “fiscal fraud.” 88 In response,
the Fiscal Committee admitted that eliminating homeless income had never previously been a
high priority in their international tax analyses. 89 Nonetheless, the Fiscal Committee offered no
solutions to the problem of homeless income other than suggesting that individual countries take
independent action to combat “fiscal fraud.” 90 Although it was clear that without action the
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problem of homeless income would continue unabated, the independent action recommended by
the Fiscal Committee was met with nothing more than a lukewarm response form the members
of the League of Nations. 91
Change often only occurs out of necessity and this was no exception. The problem of
homeless provoked a tectonic shift in the prevailing attitude towards territorial taxation. As
World War II raged, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations permitted a subcommittee to
explore possible changes to the 1935 Revised Draft Model Treaty. 92 This subcommittee
contained representatives from the developing countries of Latin America. 93 Tired of suffering
under the bias against developing countries inherent in a worldwide system of taxation, the
subcommittee firmly endorsed the concept of source-based taxation. 94 This endorsement
directly contradicted the multi-decade policy of the League favoring worldwide taxation. 95
The subcommittee’s findings became known as the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty after the
country in which the bulk of the subcommittee’s meetings took place. 96 The subcommittee
argued that territorial taxation was the sole method of effectively dealing with the problem of
homeless income. 97 Territoriality would be achieved through the adoption of two provisions:
“(1) [p]rimary taxing authority over interest, dividends, royalties, and annuities was given to the
source country, not the country of residence” and “(2) [a] nonresident entity’s business profits
that are not attributable to a PE [permanent establishment] were subject to source country
taxation if the activities in the source country were more than isolated or occasional.” 98
Unsurprisingly, the revolutionary proposals contained in the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty
were not embraced by the Fiscal Committee. 99 But the subcommittee’s work did prompt the
Fiscal Committee to develop their own revised convention known as the 1946 London Model
Convention. 100 Like the 1946 Mexico Model Treaty, the 1946 London Model Convention was
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based on two principles. 101 First, the taxation of interest, dividends, annuities, and royalties
derived from commercial, scientific, and industrial property would remain the prerogative of the
country of residence. 102 Second, an MNC’s profits were only subject to source-based taxation if
it had a permanent establishment. 103 The 1946 London Model Convention defined a permanent
establishment only as a fixed place or business or an agent that was authorized to make binding
decisions on behalf of the parent corporation. 104
Once again the Fiscal Commission failed to address the problem of homeless income
other than reaffirming its belief that homeless income was a problem of tax administration and
not a side effect of worldwide taxation. 105 The Fiscal Committee maintained that the problem
would be solved only if individual countries took independent action to address the problem. 106
Despite the Fiscal Commission’s ultimate rejection of the 1943 Mexico Model Treaty,
the subcommittee’s work left an indelible impression on the international taxation debate. 107
The Fiscal Committee was forced to acknowledge that there was a demand for territorial taxation
among developing countries. 108 Even after reaffirming worldwide taxation in the 1946 London
Model Convention, the Fiscal Committee understood that territoriality would persist as the
preference for countries akin to those on the subcommittee. 109
f. Modern Developments
In 1951, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), an international business
organization, examined the festering issue of homeless income. 110 The ICC report advocated
treating countries in which MNCs located holding companies as countries of residence even if
those countries did not have income taxes. 111 Instead of trying to eliminate the problem of
homeless income, the ICC report sought to perpetuate it. 112 This reflected the ICC’s recognition
that the international business community had come to rely on homeless income. 113
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By 1967, the United Nations (UN), the successor organization to the now-defunct League
of Nations, sought to explore new ways of handling cross-border taxation. 114 The UN’s
Economic and Social Council requested that the UN secretary-general appoint a working group
of exports from both developed and developing countries to tackle the issue. 115 Thus, the Ad
Hoc Group of Experts on International Tax Cooperation in Tax Matters was born. 116
The Ad Hoc Group would issue a number of reports between 1969 and 1980. 117 At first,
the Ad Hoc group was reluctant to make any major changes to the prevailing preference for
worldwide taxation other than expanding the definition of permanent establish to allow
developing nations to enjoy more tax revenue from MNCs. 118 This changed somewhat in the
early 1970s when the Ad Hoc Group endorsed the idea of allowing source countries to apply a
gross withholding tax on interest. 119 This further chipped away at worldwide taxation.
Despite decades of pro-worldwide advocacy from the League of Nations and the UN,
recent decades have seen a marked increase in the number of countries with a territorial tax
system. 120 Among the highly industrialized economies that form the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the number with territorial systems has doubled since
the beginning of this century. 121 In fact, the United States is among only six OECD countries
that maintains a worldwide system. 122 Moreover, of all the OECD members that have switched
international tax systems since World War II, none currently use a worldwide system. 123
C. Competitive Disadvantage
U.S. policymakers are well aware that the foreign income of American citizens and
corporations is subject to double taxation. To mitigate this problem, Congress has created a
byzantine and labyrinthine system of deductions, credits, deferrals, and exclusions. The most
important of these are the aforementioned foreign tax credit and the rules regarding deferral.
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The foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations are generally structured as branches or
subsidiaries. 124 Branches have no separate foreign incorporation and their income is
immediately subject to U.S. taxes. 125 Subsidiaries are foreign affiliates that are separately
incorporated in a foreign country. 126 Most subsidiaries are Controlled Foreign Corporations
(CFCs), subsidiaries that are more than 50% owned by American shareholders. 127 U.S. taxes on
CFCs are what is known as “deferred,” meaning CFC profits remain untaxed until they are
repatriated back to the U.S. 128
The ability of American corporations to use the deferral process to their advantage is
circumscribed by layers of anti-deferral rules known “subpart F” rules because they are
enumerated in subpart F of subchapter N of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 129 For example,
the passive income (dividends and interest) of CFCs and CFC income from transaction with third
party countries is immediately subject to U.S. taxes. 130 These and other provisions greatly
increase the tax compliance costs for citizens and corporations in worldwide tax systems. In
fact, 46% of federal tax compliance costs for Fortune 500 companies emanated from such laws
and regulations regarding foreign income. 131
Despite contrary arguments from proponents of the worldwide system, worldwide
taxation does not insulate American corporations from overseas competition. Under the current
system, if American, Irish, and Dutch firms were all bidding for an investment opportunity in
Ireland, the Irish and Dutch firms would only be subject to the 12.5% Irish corporate income tax.
The American firm would owe the same 12.5% to the Irish government and an additional 22.5%
to the American government to account for the difference between the 35% American rate and
the 12.5% Irish rate which would be ineligible for the foreign tax credit. 132 Perhaps other factors
would allow the American firm to underbid the others regardless of the added tax liability, but it
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certainly puts the other firms at a comparative advantage vis-à-vis tax considerations. With over
90% of non-American OECD-based Forbes 500 companies located in territorial tax jurisdictions,
American corporations are engaging their competitors with one hand tied behind their backs. 133
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Camp Proposal
In the last decade, the “adoption of a territorial tax system has been recommended by the
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), the co-chairs of the National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (“Bowles-Simpson” Commission, 2010), the
President’s Export Council (2010), . . . [and] the President’s Council on Science and Technology
(2011).” 134 In response to such recommendations, Congressman Dave Camp (R-MI), Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee, released a proposal for the adoption of a territorial
system in October 2011. 135 A companion, though not quite identical, proposal was released by
Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) of the Senate Finance Committee in February 2012. 136
Chairman Camp’s proposal would exempt 95% of foreign corporate profits from U.S.
taxation. 137 Additionally, a transition tax of 5.25% would be immediately applied to the $1.4
trillion of existing deferred foreign income. 138 Branches would be treated as CFCs, as would
subsidiaries with Americans owning at least 10% of shares under certain circumstances. 139
Other provisions are designed to prevent base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by limiting or
eliminating the exemption from U.S. taxes for interest and certain highly-mobile intangible
assets. 140
Chairman Camp’s proposal bars credits and deductions for foreign taxes for any dividend
that is already eligible for the dividends received deduction. 141 The dividends received
deduction merely allows corporate shareholders to deduct dividends on shares the corporation
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owns in another corporation. 142 Included in this are withholding taxes levied by foreign
governments on dividend distributions previously taxed under subpart F. 143 This is a component
of Chairman Camp’s overall reform of the foreign tax credit apparatus. 144
Gains realized by American shareholders from sales of stock in a qualified foreign
corporation would also be eligible for the 95% exemption if certain requirements are met. 145
However, if American shareholders realize losses from such a sale, those losses cannot be
deducted from U.S. taxes. 146 A qualified foreign corporation is defined as a foreign corporation
with dividend distributions that are eligible for the dividends received deduction. 147
Additionally, a qualified foreign corporation must also meet an active asset standard requiring 70
percent of corporate assets to be active over the previous three years. 148
Chairman Camp’s proposal makes only minor changes to subpart F, indicating his
proposed base-erosion rules would not replace subpart F but co-exist with subpart F. 149 One
base erosion option creates a new category of subpart F income for sales that entail moving
intangible income from the U.S. to a foreign country. 150 Income derived “from the use,
consumption, or disposition of property in the CFC’s country of incorporation or income from
services performed in that country” would not be included. 151
Alternatively, the Camp proposal contains a standard CFC rule. 152 This applies U.S.
taxation to “income earned by a CFC that is not derived from the conduct of an active trade or
business in the home country of the CFC and is not subject to a 10 percent effective rate of
foreign tax.” 153 Such CFC rules are common among nations with territorial tax systems. 154
A third base-erosion option presented by the Camp proposal involves the creation of a
foreign income called “foreign base company intangible income.” 155 Foreign base company
intangible income is simply a CFC’s intangible income. 156 Intangible income is defined in the
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Chairman Camp proposal as anything that has substantial value “independent of the services of
any individual” such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents. 157
Under the Camp proposal, foreign base company intangible income is excluded from
subpart F only if it is subject to a foreign effective tax rate less than or equal to 13.5 percent. 158
This limits the ability of American MNCs to elude U.S. taxes. Additionally, interest deductions
would be limited to curb the practice of using debt to generate tax-exempt income. 159
B. The Enzi Proposal
Senator Enzi’s proposal modifies Chairman Camp’s proposal in ways friendlier to
American MNCs. 160 Included among these are a 95 percent dividends received deduction for
“qualified foreign-source dividends from a CFC.” 161 Qualified foreign income is defined as
income that is “not effectively connected with a U.S. business or received from an 80-percentowned U.S. corporation.” 162 These dividends would be subject to an effective tax rate of no
more than 1.75 percent. 163
Additionally, the Enzi proposal differs from the Camp proposal in that it does not exempt
income from the foreign branches of an American corporation. 164 Instead, each American
corporation is provided a deduction amounting to 50 percent of its yearly qualified foreign
income. 165 Qualified foreign income is “all intangible income derived . . . through U.S. business
activity in connection with property sold, leased, licensed, or transferred in any way for use,
consumption, or disposition outside the United States, or through U.S. business activity in
connection with services provided for persons or property located outside the United States.” 166
This provision subsidizes the foreign use of domestically-developed intangibles by American
MNCs . 167
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Senator Enzi’s draft calls for the replacement of subpart F anti-deferral rules with a “lowtaxed-income test.” 168 If any non-qualified business income is not subject to an effective foreign
tax rate above half the U.S. corporate tax rate it would be subject to taxation under subpart F. 169
Qualified business income is defined as income from business operations in a foreign country
where the business has a fixed permanent residence that is substantially related to business
operations in that country. 170 Both the low-taxed-income test and determinations regarding
qualified business income would be conducted on a country-by-country basis. 171
Senator Enzi proposes a separate limitation of foreign tax credits for foreign taxes on
intangible foreign earnings. 172 Additionally, export sales would be treated as U.S.-source
income for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation. 173 Subpart F would also be tweaked
by making permanent the exceptions for active finance and active insurance. 174
Contrary to Chairman Camp’s proposal, Senator Enzi’s proposal would allow, but not
require, a one-time election regarding the accumulated deferred foreign earnings of a CFC. 175
This income would be subject to an effective tax rate of no more than 10.5 percent. 176 While
each CFC is allowed to make a separate election, the taxable portion may not be reduced by
foreign tax credits, which is also a provision that is not included in Chairman Camp’s
proposal. 177 The Enzi proposal would allow taxes on increased subpart F income to be paid in
no more than eight annual installments. 178
In order to avoid untaxed pre-effective-date earnings ineligible for the Enzi proposal’s 95
percent dividends received deduction, a corporation must make the election for accumulated
foreign income during the first year the corporations receives CFC treatment. 179 As a result, a
rule for post-effective-date distributions is a necessity. 180 These dividend distributions will be
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eligible for foreign tax credits only if American corporations pay the dividends to American
shareholders. 181

B. 2005 Repatriation Tax Holiday
Until the United States adopts a territorial tax system, the benefits such a system would
yield remain in the realm of conjecture no matter how informed the prognostications. However,
the results of a recent experiment are encouraging.
In 2004, Congressman Phil English (R-PA) successfully persuaded Congress to insert a
provision into the American Jobs Creation Act that allowed American corporations to repatriate
their foreign income subject to a super low 5.25% income tax rate for one year (2005). 182 This
yielded in excess of $275 billion in foreign repatriations. 183 The Treasury’s cut amounted to $17
billion in additional corporate taxes for fiscal years (FY) 2005-06. 184 This represented an
increase of $16.4 billion in two years over what the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
estimated for the same period and a $20.2 billion increase over JCT’s predicted $3.2 billion loss
in corporate tax revenue over 10 years. 185 These numbers also fail to account for the increase in
other federal taxes that accompanied $275 billion in new investment. 186
The effect that the tax holiday had on encouraging repatriation was even greater than the
effect on the exchequer. For the first time since the records began in 1952, foreign earnings
retained abroad were negative during the latter half of FY2005. 187 The amount of foreign
income held overseas declined by a combined $142.9 billion during the third and fourth quarters
of FY2005. 188
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It is important to note that these were the results of a one-time tax holiday that reduced
the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 5.25%. It goes to reason that the increase in
repatriations would increase substantially if all or nearly all foreign earnings were permanently
exempt from U.S. taxes as is characteristic of a territorial tax system.

IV. DISCOURAGING CAPITAL FLIGHT
Proponents of maintaining the current worldwide system insist that shifting to a territorial
system will exacerbate BEPS. 189 While discouraging such behavior will always remain a
concern for policymakers, there are reasons to believe that adopting a territorial system will not
result in any large scale hemorrhaging of capital.
A. Anti-Inversion Rules
An inversion occurs when a corporate parent moves from one country to another. 190
Most inversions entail a two-step process of corporate reorganization. 191 First, the shareholders
of the parent corporation exchange their stock for stock in newly incorporated foreign
subsidiary. 192 This step removes corporate parenthood from the American corporation and
places it in the foreign subsidiary. 193 However, the corporate entity as a whole remains subject
to subpart F anti-deferral rules if the American corporation remains a part of the corporate
structure. 194 Therefore, the second step of an inversion is liquidating the American
corporation. 195 Corporate inversions are often used as a strategy to lessen the corporation’s tax
burden. 196
Corporate inversions are taxed by the federal government. 197 This is justified on
equitable grounds. 198 American multinational corporations have benefitted from their U.S.
residence through the enjoyment of property rights, limited liability, and other amenities. 199
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Therefore, IRC § 367(a) makes gains from stock transfers to related foreign corporations
immediately taxable unless stringent regulations are met. 200 This serves to make corporate
inversions costly.
To avoid the high cost of inversion, corporate planners have sought ways to
circumnavigate the rules. 201 Federal regulators were alarmed when the publicly-traded
American personal care products manufacturer Helen of Troy, Ltd. inverted to Bermuda in
1994. 202 Helen of Troy’s clever use of a Bermuda-based holding company to skirt U.S. tax
liability for both the corporation and its shareholders particularly troubled policymakers. 203 In
response, the U.S. Treasury Department adopted regulations between 1994-96 bringing Helenof-Troy-style reorganizations under the U.S. tax net. 204 These regulations expanded the
definition of a taxable stock transfer and curtailed the acquisition of American corporations by
small or asset-less “shell” corporations abroad. 205 This has further limited the ability of
corporations to expatriate without experiencing significant financial pain. 206
B. CFC Rules
Capital flight is furthered discouraged by the proliferation of CFC rules in countries with
territorial systems. 207 Generally, CFC rules exclude from the general foreign income exemption
income that is both highly mobile and not subject to taxation in the foreign country. 208 In other
words, only income that has real presence in a foreign country, a discernible purpose (other than
tax avoidance) for being there, and a substantial tax burden enjoys the benefits of territoriality. 209
This greatly limits the abuses of the territorial system without eliminating the benefits of such a
system. 210
Such barriers to tax avoidance are included in the Camp-Enzi proposal. 211 Specifically,
Camp-Enzi calls for the exclusion of CFC income that is not tethered to a foreign location and
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subject to an effective tax rate under 10% from the general territorial exemption. 212 This
provision is analogous to CFC provisions in dozens of other countries. 213
C. Service-Based Economy
As economies advance and populations become wealthier, the demand for various
services increases. 214 Naturally, the service sector comes to account for a greater and greater
share of total output. 215 Today, services account for 70% of total output in OECD countries. 216
This development places intrinsic limits on BEPS.
If the U.S. were to adopt a territorial tax system, income earned in the U.S. would still be
subject to U.S. taxation. The markets for services are relatively immobile as most services
require service providers to have some contact with whom they serve. 217 Therefore, most
service industry MNCs require some permanent establishment in the markets that they serve. 218
As the United States remains the world’s largest consumer market, it goes to reason that a shift to
a territorial system will not deter service industry MNCs from seeking American customers.
It is also important to consider the remarkable reversal that has occurred since the end of
World War II regarding the developed and the developing worlds. For decades, developed
countries advocated for worldwide taxation because they were net capital exporters. 219 This
allowed developed to reap the tax benefit from the foreign operations of MNCs headquartered in
their country. 220 Naturally, developing countries objected to this as it deprived them of tax
revenue from operations within their borders. 221
During the last half of the twentieth century, the United States shifted from a net capital
exporter to a net capital importer. 222 The irony is completed by the companion shift of many
developing countries to net capital exporters over the same period. 223 The result of this reversal
of fortune is that MNCs headquartered in developing countries are now coming to the United
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States and other developed countries in search of investment opportunities. 224 Therefore, the
same worldwide system that used to disadvantage developing countries now disadvantages the
United States. 225 Most other developed countries, including Great Britain, the great imperial
power of the past, have adapted to this phenomenon by shifting to a territorial system of
taxation. 226
V. CONCLUSION
Macroeconomic events over the last half century have made the worldwide system of
international taxation increasingly untenable. 227 The theory of capital export neutrality has seen
its time come and go. 228 Consequently, the number of nations that employ worldwide systems of
taxation has fallen precipitously since its mid-century apogee. 229 After decades of rejection, the
age of territoriality has arrived.
In light of these developments, the United States should adopt a territorial system of
international taxation. The United States of America is an exceptional nation and Americans
have traditionally prided themselves on their outlier status. However, there is no need to inflict
unnecessary hardship on American individuals and businesses for sole purpose of maintaining
national pride. Uniqueness for its own sake is not a virtue. And conformity out of self-interest is
not a vice.
The fact that American citizens and corporations are subject to double taxation under the
current worldwide system is not disputed. 230 In fact, the array of deductions, credits, deferrals,
and exclusions exists to remedy this very problem. Like most solutions that mitigate the
symptoms of a problem rather than attack the cause, this remedy causes problems of its own.
Instead of diverting resources that would have gone to Uncle Sam through the double taxation of
foreign earning into productive activities, it merely forces an inordinate amount of resources into
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the unproductivity activity of tax compliance. Johnny Depp may not have described this
phenomena using terms of art but he undoubtedly understood it. 231
Nor does adhering to a worldwide system improve American economic
competitiveness. 232 In recent decades, the number of America’s competitors located in territorial
tax systems has increased dramatically. 233 However, corporate tax revenue has remained
remarkably stable throughout the OECD in the face of such a pronounced and one-sided shift. 234
This betrays the presence of incentives discouraging capital flight. Similar or greater incentives
either exist or could one day exist in the United States. In economics, there are no benefits
without costs, but a shift to a territorial tax system would maximize the former and minimize the
latter.
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